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The Contradictions of Liberal Thought
Knowledge and Politics. By Roberto Mangabeira Unger. New York:
The Free Press, 1975. Pp. ix, 336. $12.95.
Reviewed by Karsten Harriest
Roberto Mangabeira Unger's Knowledge and Politics" has its origin
in perplexity: working on some problems of legal theory Unger dis-
covered that the solutions offered were not only inadequate, but led in
incompatible directions. The "house of reason" in which he had been
working proved to be "a prison-house of paradox whose rooms did not
connect and whose passageways led nowhere.
' 2
These difficulties were not peculiar to legal theory, Unger con-
cluded, but had their foundation in a style of thought dominant in all
social disciplines. The style of thought could be shown to rest on just a
few premises, "as powerful in their hold over the mind as they are
unacknowledged and forgotten,"3 which Unger calls "the liberal doc-
trine." This doctrine, he tries to show, rules out an adequate under-
standing of self or society.
While attacks on the liberal position are as old as that position itself,
Unger insists that earlier critiques suffered from their partiality and
were unable to free themselves from their origin in liberal thought.
Liberal doctrine presumes that a whole can be understood as the sum
of its parts ("the principle of analysis"). Unger instead demands "total
criticism," which insists that a whole be treated as an indivisible unity
("the principle of totality"). Such criticism has been made urgent by
social changes that liberal thought can neither comprehend nor guide.
How are the principles of liberal doctrine linked? How can liberal
doctrine be both an indivisible unity and "a prison-house of paradox"?
Unger knows that neither the unity nor the paradox can be "of a for-
t Professor of Philosophy, Yale University.
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mal logical sort. ' 4 While he does speak of entailment and contradic-
tion, such analogies are a "crutch to be cast off as soon as we start to
walk." 5 To show liberalism's unity demands a mode of explanation that
stands beyond the boundaries of formal logic and causality. 6 The ex-
planation must overcome the related separation between the order of
ideas and the order of events, since that separation does not allow
for adequate interpretation of the phenomena of consciousness and
culture. The unity of a successful work of art cannot be explained
in terms of causality or logical necessity, but calls for "a method of
appositeness or symbolic interpretation. ' 7 Only such interpretation
can do justice to meaningful wholes. Somewhat as one might speak
of the "theme" of a work of art, Unger speaks of the liberal doctrine
as the animating center of modem society, as a "hidden framework
of ideas," a "'deep structure' " which determines "[t]he opportunities
for thought available to us within a given vision of the world.
' 8
But can criticism ever become total? As Unger is aware, to the
extent that what is accepted as sense is determined by the position to
be criticized, total criticism must be considered nonsense. It is mean-
ingful only if a tension exists between the position criticized and our
humanity, only if the critic is able to articulate what already has a
claim on those whom he would address. In apparent accord, Unger
thus points out that "[m]uch in modem thought is irreconcilable with
liberal principles." Only "[b]ecause we are men as well as liberals" can
we meaningfully criticize the liberal doctrine. 10 Yet this suggests that
we should understand the liberal doctrine as part of a larger whole and
analyze its place in that whole. There is thus contradiction in Unger's
own position. For as the principle of totality is tempered with the
principle of analysis, total criticism must turn into partial criticism.
Just this Unger wants to avoid.
"The principle of analysis is the eternal enemy of revolution,"" he
contends, for it renders the attempt to criticize and change society as
a whole incomprehensible and thus dismisses it. Yet with at least as
much justification one can claim that the principle of totality is the
enemy of revolution. For if society is to be viewed as an all-encom-










Vol. 85: 847, 1976
The Contradictions of Liberal Thought
understood by members of that society. The call for total revolution
is necessarily empty and ineffective. Fortunately Knowledge and
Politics is not an exercise in total criticism, but offers us a challenging
partial critique of premises we too often take for granted.
Unger's statement of the liberal doctrine provides a simple but
illuminating model. Liberalism's "unreflective view" of mind and
society can be reduced, Unger tries to show, to six principles which
form a coherent whole. Three are principles of liberal psychology;
three are principles of liberal political theory. As the view is sketched
for us, it owes more to Hobbes than to any other thinker, although
Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Kant also have to be mentioned.
Fundamental to liberal psychology is "the principle of reason and
desire." The self is bifurcated into understanding, reason, or thought
on the one hand, and desire, feeling, or sentiment on the other. From
this bifurcation follows the separation of fact and value, description
and evaluation. The second principle, an extension of the first, states
that "desires are arbitrary from the perspective of the understand-
ing."'12 Reason is limited to what is, so there can be no truly practical
reason. Given this principle of liberal psychology, "practical reason"
must degenerate into technical reason: we can dispute only about
means, not about ends. The third principle of liberal psychology is
the already mentioned "principle of analysis," that a whole can be
understood as the sum of its parts. Unger tries to demonstrate that
liberal psychology is inevitably caught in the contradiction or "anti-
nomy" of reason and desire. "Schizophrenia brings to light the hidden
truth of the moral condition liberal psychology describes." 13 Cor-
responding to the two elements of the self, liberalism is said to have
developed both "a morality of reason" and "a morality of desire."
But how, given Unger's statement of the first principle of liberal
psychology, can there be a morality of reason at all? Kant's ethical
theory maly well be "the purest example of the morality of reason,"' 4
but Unger's first principle does not allow for it. Given that principle,
reason cannot oppose categorical imperatives to natural inclinations;
it cannot promote substantive ends, not even the end of freedom, but
only serve desire. Unger admits as much: "The idea of practical
reason took a long time to be abandoned by the modems, but it is
certainly incompatible with the premises of liberal psychology."'' 5
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is paradoxical in that it posits satisfaction as the aim of desire and yet
understands man as a being which cannot be except as desiring;
thus it condemns him to an impossible task. But must the morality of
desire be tied to an ethics that "canonizes contentment," a kind of
being at one with oneself which is denied to us by our temporality? 6
In Plato's Gorgias, Callicles disputes this, and Nietzsche has shown the
strength of Callicles's position.
The morality of desire does not deny the importance of reason al-
together. Yet Unger argues that although liberal psychology "allows
reason a subsidiary role in planning the satisfaction of the appetites,"
this is not enough to ensure the possibility of an ordering of desires.17
But could reason not discover such an order as an empirical fact? One
could argue that the very existence of society presupposes considerable
agreement concerning the order of desires. The morality of desire need
not abandon us "to our random and changing appetites."'"
Three principles of liberal political theory are said to correspond
to these three psychological principles. The "principle of reason and
desire" has its analogue in the "principle of rules and values." The
"principle of arbitrary value" is reflected in a "principle of subjective
value." The "principle of analysis" is met by the "principle of in-
dividualism."
The liberal doctrine demands legal formalism. The need for rules,
according to the liberal position, "arises from the undying enmity
and the demands of collaboration that mark social life."' 9 The con-
flict of subjective values requires the establishment of an artificial
and formal order of impersonal rules or laws which can bridle man's
egoism, and yet is supported by that egoism. The social contract is to
be both the instrument of man's self-love and its remedy. Legislation
and adjudication must be free from individual bias. "In its strictest
version, the formalist theory of adjudication states that the legal sys-
tem will dictate a single, correct solution in every case. It is as if it
were possible to deduce correct judgments from the laws by an auto-
matic process. The regime of legal justice can therefore be established
through a technique of adjudication that can disregard the 'policies' or
'purposes' of the law. ' 20
But the ambiguity of words and situations, an ambiguity which is
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sense of value, denies what formalism requires. The problem is not
solved when we give up formalism for a theory which holds that the
judge must consider the point of the law. "In the absence of a pro-
cedure for policy decision, the judge will inescapably impose his own
subjective preferences, or someone else's, on the litigants." 2' 1 A neat
separation between the sphere of law and that of subjective value
thus cannot be maintained, for legislation and adjudication are the
work of concrete persons. This is the antinomy of rule and values; a
system of laws or rules "can neither dispense with a consideration of
values in the process of adjudication, nor be made consistent with
such a consideration." 22 The subjectivity of values cannot be recon-
ciled with the demanded neutrality and formality of the law.
I find convincing Unger's statement of this "antinomy" of rules and
values and his suggestion that only a shared sense of value might
soften it sufficiently to allow for the liberal solution to the problem
of social order. If Unger is right, only a total transformation of liberal
society could bring about such a sense of shared values; liberalism is
unable to furnish a consensus which is based on more than a pre-
carious convergence of individual interests. But are we not entitled to
assume certain general inclinations? Even Hobbes takes for granted
that, atomized as they are, persons share certain ends; only this allows
man to escape from the state of war. Unger does not place sufficient
emphasis on the extent to which the liberal position rests on the
assumption that certain values are shared. Admittedly this does not
furnish the demanded "stable, authoritative Archimedean point,"23
nor does it eliminate the tension between the formality of the law and
subjective value; liberalism presupposes a certain tolerance for pre-
cariousness and imperfection.
Unger finds a key to the unity of the liberal position in its denial
of intelligible essences. 24 Given that denial, order cannot simply be
discovered by examining concrete particulars. To the liberal it is the
artificial order of convention, language, and theory that becomes all
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demand for formal generality. But the requirement of formal gen-
erality is an incomplete surrogate for the doctrine of intelligible
essences; 26 it is not sufficient to guarantee that a particular law is not
arbitrary or arbitrarily applied, just as it cannot guarantee that a
particular theory is true-a point which Unger develops in his dis-
cussion of "the antinomy of theory and fact."2 7 Liberalism, he suggests,
must tend towards scepticism.
But is the affirmation of intelligible essences or of objective values
truly incompatible with liberal political thought? To raise this ques-
tion is to question the unity of Unger's six principles. Unger argues
that opposition to objective values is central to liberal political theory,
for "[i]f we were able to perceive such values, they would become the
true foundation of the social order."28 Is it not possible to maintain
that there are given values, but that they are known only with dif-
ficulty, or that our pride does not let these values become effective?
In either case we could not count on their perception to furnish the
principles of social order. To do so would be to confuse persons with
angels. Critics of liberal political thought have overlooked too often
what is right in the traditional view of man as essentially fallen. To
accept the political theory of liberalism one does not have to accept
the principle of subjective value or what Unger terms liberal
psychology.
Criticism should lead to reconstruction. For Unger the direction
which reconstruction must take is indicated by the inadequacies of
the criticized position. Its tensions point toward an ideal of a way
of life more integrated than liberalism allows. Unger finds further
hints of such an existence in religious worship, art, and love, which,
fleeting and incomplete, "need to be completed by a transformation of
society that extends to the whole of life what they achieve in a limited
sphere of existence."29 Surely the reality of the socialist state and the
gradual evolution of the welfare-corporate state, with growing emphasis
on solidarity and community, betray a weakening of the liberal vision
with its emphasis on the individual. Unger, however, rightly insists
that a negation of liberalism which would sacrifice the individual to
the community would be as one-sided as liberalism itself. The ideal of
identity, everything depends on the names we give them....
... Properly understood, the system of public rules is itself a language. Every rule
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the self should strive for a balance between individual and community.
Unger does not claim originality for his doctrine of the self. Quite
the contrary: "All the great thinkers of Europe have contributed to
its development, for it is the theoretical expression of that more basic
insight into humanity no theory has managed to destroy."30 Central
to Unger's position is the assumption that there is "a unitary human
nature"; this nature should not be thought of as a timeless essence;
rather it "changes and develops in history." It is this nature which
"constitutes the final basis of moral judgment in the absence of ob-
jective values and in the silence of revelation.""'
Man belongs to nature, yet transcends it as consciousness; he belongs
to society, yet is separated from it as an individual. Liberalism has
emphasized the moment of separation, while its communitarian critics
have emphasized integration. The ideal sketched by Unger tries to do
justice to both separation and integration. Thus he looks for a "nat-
ural harmony" which will give us a sense of being a part of nature
while standing apart from it. Love, art, and worship are inadequate
representations of this harmony; the main device for joining the
human and the natural is work. But, finally, tension must remain: the
gap between culture and nature cannot be closed. It is a mistaken in-
sistence on the possibility of such closure which Unger sees as "[p]er-
haps the main vice in the Hegelian-Marxist theory of work. ' 32
Unger's ideal similarly demands "a way in which union with the
others would foster rather than diminish the sense of [one's] own
individual being. ' 33 Personal love has a superior analogue in the idea
of a community of shared purpose, whose members would find mean-
ing in work that served an ideal of universal significance.
How is this to be realized? Unger's "theory of organic groups" offers
hints rather than specific instructions. Philosophy, he points out, can-
not take the place of political prudence. In present social reality, any
attempt to realize the ideal of a purposive community is condemned to
the utopian or revolutionary fringe of society and cannot transform
the established order. "Until the problems of domination created by
the hegemony of class and role are solved in the society at large, no
alternative to the principle of subjective value can be found."3 4 The
required solution can only be political; it demands "the attack on
imperialism in international relations, the subversion of the principle
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of role or merit through democracy internal to the bureaucratic in-
stitutions." 35
Unger knows that the ideal which he has posited is in one sense
incoherent-"the different elements of the communitarian ideal ul-
timately conflict."36 The gap between man and nature, between in-
dividuality and sociability, between infinite longing and the finitude
of life cannot be closed.37 The antinomies of liberal thought have their
counterpart in "the dilemmas of communitarian politics." One won-
ders why these dilemmas should not lead to a critique of the com-
munitarian ideal to parallel the critique of liberalism.
Unger admits that his ideal cannot be realized; rather it is offered
as a "regulative ideal." He grants that it may be impossible to strike a
balance which would reduce the tensions of human existence,38 and
that it might "turn out that there is no unitary human nature" of the
kind he describes.39 In that case "the premises of liberal thought would
become all the more true and the political acceptance of the sub-
jectivity of values all the more indispensable a guarantee of individual
autonomy." 40 Unger's critique of liberalism rests on a faith which
accepts "a correspondence between being and goodness," 41 a faith
which lets him conclude with an appeal to God, whom men require "to
complete the change of the world by carrying them into His presence
and giving them what, left to themselves, they would always lack."
42
For this reader such an ending reinforces serious doubts concerning
Unger's critique of the liberal position. The idea of a union that could
reconcile the tensions marking human existence is elsewhere said by
Unger to be contradictory. But God is that idea. The goal of man's
striving is shrouded in paradox; the attempt to find a way out of the
"antinomies" of liberal thought posits a goal which is contradictory.
Liberalism escapes contradiction only because it recognizes and does
not try to eliminate the tensions between role and person, public and
private, state and society, but seeks to ensure their uneasy balance.
Liberalism may warrant a partial critique, but hardly total criticism.
Unger's insistence on the latter is informed by an ideal of wholeness
and integration which, though it has haunted man, is incompatible
with human reality. The attempt to approximate this ideal must
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American Lawyers in a Changing Society, 1776-1876. By Maxwell
Bloomfield. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
1976. Pp. ix, 397. $15.00.
Reviewed by Jerold S. Auerbacht
It is difficult to conceptualize a formative era of American law, a
veritable Golden Age, in which the legal profession itself reached a
nadir. So it was, however, according to the conventional if contradic-
tory canons of 19th-century American legal history. Nation-building
and economic growth between the Revolution and the Civil War re-
quired enormous legal energy and creativity. By 1820, according to
Charles M. Haar's account in The Golden Age of American Law, "the
essential task of clearing and preparing the ground for legal institu-
tions had been completed, and a period of intense legal development
began which lasted until approximately 1860 .... Subsequent genera-
tions were to put the finishing touches to the structure ... but it was
the men of this era who laid the foundation and erected the frame-
work."I
It sounds plausible. But the simultaneous demise of the legal pro-
fession under the impact of Jacksonian democracy, as related by Roscoe
Pound and Anton-Hermann Chroust, just does not fit. It strains
credulity to believe that such an extraordinarily creative era was also
a period of professional decadence. After 1830, we are told, profes-
sional standards fell with the influx of large numbers of lawyers
"unfit by character, culture, or training to become members of a
learned profession. ' 2 The result, according to Chroust (echoing
Pound), was "the deterioration of the American bar."3
Not until Morton J. Horwitz illuminated the ideological conserva-
tism of American legal historiography could any sense be made of the
disparity between the rise of law and the decline of lawyers. Horwitz
showed how historians had absorbed the self-serving categories of the
legal profession, which measured the stature of the bar by criteria of
t Associate Professor of History and Director of American Studies, Wellesley College.
1. Haar, Introduction to THE GOLDEN AGE OF AMERICAN LAW at vi (C. Haar ed. 1965).
2. II A. CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA 286 (1965).
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craftsmanship and technical training, rather than by democratic access
and professional service.4 Within this dubious framework, the status of
the bar increased as it restricted access and maintained the aura of law
as a mysterious science. With elitism, privilege, and status ideologically
intertwined, democratization-as Pound and his disciples concluded-
inevitably meant deterioration.
The Whiggish bias of 19th-century legal history has now been
dealt a fatal blow by Professor Maxwell Bloomfield of Catholic Uni-
versity. His American Lawyers in a Changing Society, 17 76-1 876 5
examines the conventional wisdom, finds it wanting, and offers a
convincing alternative interpretation. Bloomfield's volume consists of
biographical and thematic essays whose focus is "the interaction be-
tween law, lawyers, and American society."" The subjects of the
biographical chapters include Peter Van Schaack, a Loyalist attorney;
William Sampson, an Irish immigrant lawyer prominent in the codi-
fication movement; and John Mercer Langston, a black lawyer who
was the first dean of Howard Law School. Among the thematic essays,
those on "Antilawyer Sentiment in the Early Republic" and "Up-
grading the Professional Image" are the gems of the book. They
sparkle with insights that illuminate the subtle relationships between
the legal profession and American society during the first century of
our national life.
Bloomfield traces the persistent tension between lawyers and society
as the colonies evolved from orthodox communitarian enclaves,
founded on egalitarian or Biblical precepts (both of which were
hostile to a professional class of lawyers), into complex, heterodox
societies in which morality yielded to law-and to lawyers. The lawyer
became a mistrusted symbol of the constraints of civilization, the
member of a privileged group removed from popular control. Al-
ternatives to legal professionalism were explored: arbitration without
professional pleaders or adversary proceedings; and socialization,
which accepted a professional bar but insisted upon state control of it
in the public interest. But the cry against professional privilege,
Bloomfield suggests, came less from the propertyless masses than from
those who wanted to preserve their property against the high costs and
delays of litigation. A middle-class public, committed to competition
and mobility, was "unwilling to forego the advantages of an in-
4. Honvitz, The Conservative Tradition in the Writing of American Legal History,
17 Am. J. LEGAL Hisr. 275 (1973).
5. M. BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIEry, 1776-1876 (1976) [here-
inafter cited by page number only].
6. P. viii.
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dividualistic legal system in favor of some more equitable communi-
tarian experiment."7 Even so, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania en-
couraged arbitration, and nonlawyers were appointed to various state
benches. One lay judge in New Hampshire even had the temerity to
instruct a jury: "[G]entlemen, it is not law that we want, but justice." s
If they wanted justice, they got lawyers. Because professional priv-
ilege elicited bursts of public hostility, 19th-century attorneys found
it necessary to upgrade their professional image. Again Bloomfield
locates the source of criticism in demands of the bourgeoisie for ex-
panded services and opportunity, not in the "sans-culotte radicalism"
that Story, Kent, and their 20th-century progeny found perverse plea-
sure in discovering. 9 Indeed, it is Bloomfield's contention that com-
plaints against professional privilege were quite reasonable. The low-
ering of educational requirements for admission to the bar was not
evidence of anti-intellectualism or mobocracy, but "a reasoned assault
upon the privileged position of upper-middle-class practitioners and
their sons . ... -1 One result of the pressure for accessibility was
a sustained effort to refurbish the professional image: "from a design-
ing cryptopolitician into a benevolently neutral technocrat."' ", Con-
sequently, the divorce of law from politics was the supreme achieve-
ment of legal mythology during the Jacksonian era.
In an imaginative exploration of the rehabilitation of lawyers in
popular literature, Bloomfield demonstrates how the image of the
lawyer was modified from intellectual elitism and social snobbery to
a more comfortable democratic recasting that stressed rags-to-riches
opportunity. Ultimately Lincoln was apotheosized within this new
myth: he served as a model of the "uncultivated 'genius' who learned
his lessons directly from the book of nature.' 1 2 Bloomfield is properly
attentive to the combination of economic egalitarianism and old-stock
Americanism that assured professional access and upward mobility to
poor, ambitious boys-as long as they were native-born Caucasians.
Plucky heroes of Horatio Alger success stories were welcome if they
came from southern Illinois and eastern Kentucky, but not if their
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In the struggle between competing values of democracy and elitism,
the codification movement of the early 19th-century figured promi-
nently. Here Bloomfield is at his best in weaving the career of one
lawyer, William Sampson, into a complex fabric of social change.
Sampson, an Irish immigrant and outsider to the legal profession, was
a prototype for 20th-century moderately liberal attorneys who took
too seriously the promise of equal justice, confronted professional
rigidity and hostility, and were driven to more radical positions.
Sampson arrived in America in 1806, in time to encounter the hysteria
of the Federalist bar over fugitives from the Irish struggle for in-
dependence. A state supreme court ruling made him the last alien to
be admitted to the New York bar. His colleagues ostracized him; he
was restricted to a foreign-born, impoverished clientele. Sampson felt
increasingly constrained by the binding precedent-worship of common
law judges. In a scathing critique, published in 1826, he called for
legislative codification. Sampson, Bloomfield writes, was a 19th-cen-
tury Luther, "called to purge the law of its superstitions and ir-
rational features so that it might be reestablished on a basis of sound
principles intelligible to the average man."' 3 Law must cease to be a
mysterious science comprehensible only to its priestly guardians; it
must be tested by principles of reason, justice, and convenience.
Although Sampson was critical of judicial policymaking, he stopped
short of the biting class consciousness of his Jeffersonian predecessors
or Benthamite contemporaries. Sampson was a reformer who wanted
to preserve the professional bar, yet encourage laymen to participate
more directly in legal affairs that directly impinged upon their lives.
Indeed Sampson, though subsequently vilified, demonstrated a pre-
Jacksonian stage of consciousness. Within a decade after Sampson's
essay was published, the common lawyer, no less than the common
law, was under far sharper attack from Robert Rantoul and other
Jacksonian egalitarians. Bloomfield provides glimpses of the exciting
flux of legal and social change in that era, a subject that still awaits
comprehensive historical exploration (and will begin to receive it with
the forthcoming, publication of Horwitz's study of 19th-century law,
and the Daniel Webster legal papers edited by Alfred S. Konefsky).
Bloomfield is sympathetic to the reform impulse, a "gradual and
piecemeal" process which meandered "between legal traditionalism
and the expanding needs of a modem democracy."' 4 Whether this
analytical framework is sufficient is a question that requires fuller
13. P. 77.
14. Pp. 87-88.
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disclosure of the complex legal and social tapestry of the Jacksonian
era. But Bloomfield has offered an important introduction to its sym-
bols and subtle hues.
Bloomfield is appropriately sensitive to the reciprocal pressures of
bar and society upon each other. The profession, he concludes, could
not be as autonomous as it desired; nor could advocates of democratiza-
tion overcome the pervasive social values of individualism and mo-
bility that blocked sweeping reform. A measure of leveling occurred;
indeed, lowering the barriers to entry increased popular respect for the
legal system (even if it diminished the self-respect of elite lawyers). By
1850, Bloomfield observes, a new equilibrium had emerged: "most non-
poor white Americans" had access to legal services. 1' Lawyers had
articulated their now familiar (if highly dubious) claim that they
served society merely by serving clients; and the bar was preoccupied
with technical proficiency and process, rather than with broad social
consequences. Bloomfield discovered occasional examples of profes-
sional service to the disadvantaged, especially in the Reconstruction
experiments of the Freedmen's Bureau. But in the legal profession, as
in the society it mirrored, there was "a vicious caste system."' 0 Most
practitioners "preferred private profit to social justice"; consequently,
"the gap between private practice and public need steadily widened."17
Perhaps it truly was a formative era after all, for the bar as for law.
Now, a century after Bloomfield's terminal date, the main outlines
of the 19th-century professional culture-especially its elitist struc-
ture and restricted services-remain instantly recognizable because they
are largely unchanged. If one merely adds to Bloomfield's picture the
institutionalization of the case method, the proliferation of university
law schools and corporate firms, and the power of professional associa-
tions, the 19th and 20th-century bars merge imperceptibly. Daniel
Webster, serving (in historian Kent Newmyer's phrase) as "a broker
between the capitalist interest group and the power of the state,"' 8
would be quite comfortable on Wall Street.
If Bloomfield has touched many vital issues, his treatment of some
of them is impeded by his commitment to a framework that is half
biographical and half thematic. Too often the subjects of his bio-
graphical essays are only tenuously connected to the themes they are
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riot control in Philadelphia and family law, are only marginally
related to the subject of the book. Even these essays, however, contain
information and insight which make valuable contributions to the
social history of the legal profession. Bloomfield's explorations of
professional mythology and literary evidence are revealing. And he is
sensitive to the ideological constraints of individualism and mobility
upon the ability of the legal profession to discharge, or even recognize,
its public responsibilities.
Analytically, Bloomfield stumbles only over the issue of class. At
pains to deny that anti-lawyer sentiment in the early republic was any
kind of Marxist class struggle, he subsequently concedes that law was
indeed perceived as an instrument of class domination. Bloomfield
seems most comfortable with those who rejected class interpretations;
hence part of his attraction to Sampson, who "worked for reform
within the legal profession." 9 Yet in his family law chapter, Bloom-
field drops the mantle of moderation to state forthrightly that "the
destitute lived by a different and contradictory set of rules. For those
on relief the law was . . . an increasingly repressive agency of social
control and regimentation .... The unhappy results of such a policy
of class segregation are all too apparent a century later. '20 And it is
the lawyer's commitment to profit, not justice, that permeates Bloom-
field's conclusion.
Any modem reader knowledgeable about the contemporary legal
profession will feel comfortable in Bloomfield's antebellum legal
world. Although there is the occasionally nagging thought that a
dose of present-mindedness enlivens the book, clearly it also enlightens
these essays and provides a belated and welcome intidote to the Whig-
gery of Pound, Chroust, and other apologists for professional elitism.
Bloomfield's perception of a profession set on its modern course more
than a century ago is compelling-and just a bit chilling. He demon-
strates how enduring are the values in American and professional his-
tory that have separated private practice from public need. Bloomfield
has not written the definitive history of the early American bar, but
his conclusions and especially his questions will provoke legal his-




Vol. 85: 855, 1976
